In this paper we propose a new approach to code-based signatures that makes use in particular of rank metric codes. When the classical approach consists in finding the unique preimage of a syndrome through a decoding algorithm, we propose to introduce the notion of mixed decoding of erasures and errors for building signature schemes. In that case the difficult problem becomes, as is the case in lattice-based cryptography, finding a preimage of weight above the Gilbert-Varshamov bound (case where many solutions occur) rather than finding a unique preimage of weight below the Gilbert-Varshamov bound. The paper describes RankSign: a new signature algorithm for the rank metric based on a new mixed algorithm for decoding erasures and errors for the recently introduced Low Rank Parity Check (LRPC) codes. We explain how it is possible (depending on choices of parameters) to obtain a full decoding algorithm which is able to find a preimage of reasonable rank weight for any random syndrome with a very strong probability. We study the semantic security of our signature algorithm and show how it is possible to reduce the unforgeability to direct attacks on the public matrix, so that no information leaks through signatures. Finally, we give several examples of parameters for our scheme, some of which with public key of size 11, 520 bits and signature of size 1728 bits. Moreover the scheme can be very fast for small base fields.
Introduction
In recent year there has been a burst of activities regarding post-quantum cryptography, the interest of such a field has become even more obvious since the recent attacks on the discrete logarithm problem in small characteristic [4] , which shows that finding new attacks on classical cryptographic systems is always a possibility and that it is important not have all its eggs in the same basket.
Among potential candidate for alternative cryptography, lattice-based and code-based cryptography are strong candidates, in this paper we consider the signature problem for code-based cryptography and especially rank metric based cryptography. The problem of finding an efficient signature algorithm has been a major challenge for code-based cryptography since its introduction in 1978 by McEliece. Signing with error-correcting codes can be achieved in different ways: the CFS algorithm [8] considers extreme parameters of Goppa codes to obtain a class of codes in which a non-negligeable part of random syndromes are invertible. This scheme has a very small signature size, however it is rather slow and the public key is very large. Another possibility is to use the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to turn a zero-knowledge authentication scheme (like the Stern authentication scheme [29] ) into a signature scheme. This approach leads to very small public keys of a few hundred bits and is rather fast, but the signature size in itself is large (about 100,000b), so that overall no wholly satisfying scheme is known.
Classical code-based cryptography relies on the Hamming distance but it is also possible to use another metric: the rank metric. This metric introduced in 1985 by Gabidulin [12] is very different from the Hamming distance. The rank metric has received in recent years very strong attention from the coding community because of its relevance to network coding. Moreover, this metric can also be used for cryptography. Indeed it is possible to construct rank-analogues of Reed-Solomon codes: the Gabidulin codes. Gabidulin codes inspired early cryptosystems, like the GPT cryposystem ( [13] ), but they turned out to be inherently vulnerable because of the very strong structure of the underlying codes. More recently, by considering an approach similar to NTRU [19] (and also MDPC codes [25] ) constructing a very efficient cryptosystem based on weakly structured rank codes was shown to be possible [14] . However, in terms of signatures based on the rank metric, only systems that use Fiat-Shamir are presently known [15] . Overall the main interest of rank-metric based cryptography, is that the complexity of the best known attack grows very fast with size of parameters: at the difference of (Hamming) code-based or of lattice-based cryptography, it is possible to obtain a general instance of the rank decoding problem with size only a few thousands bits for a (say) 2 80 security, when such sizes of parameters can be obtained only with additional structure (quasi-cyclic for instance) for code-based or lattice based cryptography.
An interesting point in code-based cryptography is that in general the security of the protocols relies on finding small weight vectors below the Gilbert-Varshamov bound (the typical minimum weight of a random code). This is noticeably different from lattice based cryptography for which it is very common for the security of a signature algorithm [18, 24] to rely on the capacity to approximate a random vector far beyond its closest lattice vector element (the Gap-CVP problem).
Traditionally, this approach was not developed for code-based cryptography since no decoding algorithm is known that decodes beyond the Gilbert-Varshamov bound: in fact this problem is somewhat marginal for the coding community since it implies many possibilities for decoding, while the emphasis is almost always to find the most probable codeword or a short list of most likely codewords.
Our contribution
The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of a new way of considering code-based signatures, by introducing the idea that it is possible to invert a random syndrome not below the Gilbert-Varshamov bound, but above it. The approach is similar in spirit to what is done in lattice-based cryptography. We describe a new algorithm for LRPC codes, a recently introduced class of rank codes, the new algorithm permits in practice decoding both errors and (generalized) rank erasures. This new algorithm enables us to approximate a syndrome beyond the Gilbert-Varshamov bound. The algorithm is a unique decoder (not a list decoder) but can give different solutions depending on the choice of the erasure. We explain precisely in which conditions one can obtain successful decoding for any given syndrome and give the related probabilistic analysis. Based on this error/erasure algorithm we propose a new signature scheme RankSign. We give conditions for which no information leakage is possible from real signatures obtained through our scheme. This point is very important since information leaking from real signatures was the weakness through which the NTRUSign scheme came to be attacked [20, 7, 27] . Finally, we give examples of parameters: they are rather versatile, and their size depends on a bound on the amount of potentially leaked information. In some cases one obtains public keys of size 11,000 bits with signatures of length 1728 bits, moreover the scheme is rather fast.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 recalls basic facts on the rank metric, Section 3 introduces LRPC codes and describes a new mixed algorithm for decoding (generalized) erasures and errors, and studies its behaviour, Section 4 shows how to use them for cryptography, and lastly, Section 5 and 6 consider security and parameters for these schemes. The details of some proofs and attacks are also given in the appendix.
2 Background on rank metric codes and cryptography 2.1 Definitions and notation Notation : Let q be a power of a prime p, m an integer and let V n be a n dimensional vector space over the finite field GF(q m ). Let β = (β 1 , . . . , β m ) be a basis of GF (q m ) over GF (q). Let F i be the map from GF (q m ) to GF (q) where F i (x) is the i-th coordinate of x in the basis β.
The rank weight of a vector v can be defined as the rank of the associated matrix v. If we name this value rank(v) we can define a distance between two vectors x, y through the formula d r (x, y) = rank(x − y). Isometry for rank metric: in a context of rank metric codes, the notion of isometry is different from Hamming distance: when for Hamming distance isometries are permutation matrices, for rank metric the isometries are invertible n × n matrices on the base field GF (q) (indeed these matrices, usually denoted by P , do not change the rank of a codeword). We refer to [22] for more details on codes for the rank distance.
A rank code C of length n and dimension k over GF (q m ) is a subspace of dimension k of GF (q m ) viewed as a (rank) metric space. The minimum rank distance of the code C is the minimum rank of non-zero vectors of the code. In the following, C is a rank metric code of length n and dimension k over GF (q m ). The matrix G denotes a k × n generator matrix of C and H one of its parity check matrix. Definition 1. Let x = (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n ) ∈ GF (q m ) n be a vector of rank r. We denote E the GF (q)-sub vector space of GF (q m ) generated by x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n . The vector space E is called the support of x. Remark 1. The notion of support of a code word for the Hamming distance and for the the one introduced in definition 1 are different but they share a common principle: in both cases, suppose one is given a syndrome s and that there exists a low weight vector x such that H.x t = s, then, if the support of x is known, it is possible to recover all the coordinates values of x by solving a linear system. Definition 2. Let e be an error vector of rank r and error support space E. We call generalized erasure of dimension t of the error e, a subspace T of dimension t of its error support E.
The notion of erasure for Hamming distance corresponds to knowing a particular position of the error vector (hence some partial information on the support), in the rank distance case, the support of the error being a subspace E, the equivalent notion of erasure (also denoted generalized erasure) is therefore the knowledge of a subspace T of the error support E.
Bounds for rank metric codes
The classical bounds for the Hamming metric have straightforward rank metric analogues, since two of them are of interest for the paper we recall them below.
Rank Gilbert-Varshamov bound [GVR] The number of elements S(m, q, t) of a sphere of radius t in GF (q m ) n , is equal to the number of m × n q-ary matrices of rank t. For t = 0 S 0 = 1, for t ≥ 1 we have (see [22] ):
From this we deduce the volume of a ball B(n, m, q, t) of radius t in GF (q m ) to be:
S(n, m, q, i)
In the linear case the Rank Gilbert-Varshamov bound GV R(n, k, m, q) for a [n, k] linear code over GF (q m ) is then defined as the smallest integer t such that B(n, m, q, t) ≥ q m(n−k) .
The Gilbert-Varshamov bound for a rank code C with dual matrix H, corresponds to the smallest rank weight r for which, for any syndrome s, there exists on the average a word x of rank weight r such that H.x t = s. To give an idea of the behaviour of this bound, it can be shown that, asymptotically in the case m = n ( [22] ): GV R(n,k,m,q) n ∼ 1 − k n .
Singleton bound
The classical Singleton bound for a linear [n, k] rank code of minimum rank r over GF (q m ) works in the same way as for linear codes (by finding an information set) and reads r ≤ 1 + n − k: in the case when n > m this bound can be rewritten as r ≤ 1 + ⌊ (n−k)m n ⌋ [22] . Codes achieving this bound are called Maximum Rank Distance codes (MRD).
Cryptography and rank codes
The main use of rank codes in the cryptographic context is through the rank analogue of the classical syndrome decoding problem.
Maximum Likelihood -Rank Syndrome Decoding problem (ML-RSD) Let H be a (n − k) × n matrix over GF (q m ) with k ≤ n, s ∈ GF (q m ) n−k . The problem is to find the smallest weight r such that rank(x) = r and Hx t = s.
In that case it is not proven that the problem is N P -hard, but this problem is very close to the syndrome decoding problem which is NP-hard, moreover the problem can be seen as a structured version of the MinRank problem which is also NP-hard (the RSD problem can be attacked as a MinRank problem but in practice the attack does not work since there are too many unknowns [9] ). Moreover the problem has been studied for more than 20 years and the best algorithms are exponential, so that the problem is generally believed to be hard.
There exist several types of generic attacks on the problem: combinatorial attacks: these attacks are usually the best ones for small values of q (typically q = 2) and when n and k are not too small (typically 30 and more), when q increases, the combinatorial aspect makes them less efficient. The first non-trivial attack on the problem was proposed by Chabaud and Stern [6] in 1996, then in 2002 Ourivski and Johannson [26] improved the previous attack and proposed a new attack, meanwhile these two attacks did not take account of the value of n in the exponent. Very recently the two previous attacks were generalized in [16] by Gaborit et al. in (n − k) 3 m 3 q (r−1)⌊ (k+1)m n ⌋ )) and take the value of n into account and were used to break some repaired versions of the GPT cryposystem.
algebraic attacks and Levy-Perret attack: the particular nature of the rank metric makes it a natural field for algebraic attacks and solving by Groebner basis, since these attack are largely independent of the value of q and in some cases may also be largely independent of m. These attacks are usually the most efficient when q increases and when the parameters are not too high (say less than 30). There exist different types of algebraic equations settings: the first one by Levy and Perret [21] in 2006 considers a quadratic setting by taking as unknowns the support E of the error and the error coordinates regarding E, there is also the Kernel attack by [9] and the minor approach which consists in considering multivariate equations of degree r + 1 obtained from minors of matrices [10] , and more recently the annulator setting by Gaborit et al. in [16] (which is valid on certain type of parameters but may not be independent on m). In our context for some of the parameters considered in the end of the paper, the Levy-Perret attack is the most efficient one to consider. The attack works as follows: suppose one starts from a [n, k] rank codes over GF (q m ) and we want to solve the RSD problem for an error e of rank weight r, the idea of the attack is to consider the support E of e as unknowns together with the error coordinates, it gives nr + m(r − 1) unknowns and m(2(n − k) − 1) equations from the syndrome equations. One obtains a quadratic system, on which one can use Groebner basis. All the complexities for Grobner basis attacks are estimated through the very nice program of L. Bettale [5] . In practice this attack becomes too costly whenever r ≥ 4 for not too small n and k.
The case of more than one solution: approximating beyond the GVR bound
In code based cryptography there is usually only one solution to the syndrome problem (for instance for the McEliece scheme), now in this situation we are interested in the case when there are a large number of solutions. This case is reminiscent of lattice-based cryptography when one tries to approximate as much as possible a given syndrome by a word of weight as low as possible.
This motivates us to introduce a new problem which corresponds to finding a solution to the general decoding problem for the case when the weight of the word associated to the syndrome is greater than the GVR bound, in that case there may be several solutions, and hence the term decoding does not seem well chosen. Notice that in a lattice cryptography context, it corresponds to the case of Gap-CVP, which does not make sense here, since it implies a multiplicative gap.
Approximate -Rank Syndrome Decoding problem (App-RSD) Let H be a (n − k) × n matrix over GF (q m ) with k ≤ n, s ∈ GF (q m ) n−k and let r be an integer. The problem is to find a solution of rank r such that rank(x) = r and Hx t = s.
It is help to first consider the situation of a binary linear [n, k] Hamming metric code. Given a random element of length n − k of the syndrome space, we know that with high probability there exists word that has this particular syndrome and whose weight is on the GV bound. This word is usually hard to find, however. Now what is the lowest minimum weight for which it is easy to find such a word ? A simple approach consists in taking n − k random column of the parity-check matrix (a potential support of the solution word) and inverting the associated matrix, multiplying by the syndrome gives us a solution of weight (n − k)/2 on average. In fact it is difficult to do better than this without a super-polynomial increase in complexity. Now for the rank metric, one can apply the same approach: suppose one starts from a random [n, k] code over GF (q m ) and that one searches for a word of small rank weight r with a given syndrome. One fixes (as in the Hamming case) a potential support for the word -here a subspace of dimension r of GF (q m )-and one tries to find a solution. Let x = (x 1 , · · · , x n ) be a solution vector, so that H.x t = s. If we consider the syndrome equations induced in the small field GF (q), there are n.r unknowns and m.(n − k) equations. Hence it is possible (with a good probability) to solve the system whenever nr ≥ m(n − k), therefore it is possible to find in probabilistic polynomial time a solution to a typical instance of the RSD problem whenever r ≥ ⌈ m(n−k) n ⌉, which corresponds to the Singleton bound. This proves the following proposition: For a rank weight r below this bound, the best known attacks are, as in the Hamming distance case, obtained by considering the cost of finding a word of rank r divided by the number of potential solutions: B(n,k,m,q) q m(n−k) . In practice the complexity we find is coherent with this.
3 Approximating a random syndrome beyond the GVR bound with LRPC codes
Decoding algorithm in rank metric
The rank metric has received a lot of attention in the context of network coding [28] . There exist very few algorithms, however, for decoding codes in the rank metric. The most well known [n, k] codes which are decodable are the Gabidulin codes [12] . These codes can correct up to n−k 2 errors, and have been proposed for encryption: but since they cannot decode up to the GVR bound, they do not seem suitable for full decoding in the spirit of [8] for signature algorithms. Another more recent family of decodable codes are the LRPC codes [14] , these codes are defined through a low rank matrix.
These codes can decode with a good probability up to n−k d errors, they can be used for encryption [14] , but since they can decode only up to n−k 2 errors at best, they also seems unsuitable for signature algorithms.
Using LRPC codes to approximate a random syndrome beyond the GVR bound
High level overview The traditional approach for decoding random syndromes, that is used by the CFS scheme for instance, consists in taking advantage of the decoding properties of a code (e.g. a Goppa code) and considering parameters for which the proportion of decodable vectors -the decodable density -is not too low. For the Hamming metric, this approach leads to very flat dual matrices, ie, codes with high rate and very low Hamming distance. In the rank metric case, this approach leads to very small decodable densities and does not work in practice. However, it is possible to proceed otherwise. It turns out that the decoding algorithm of LRPC codes can be adapted so that it is possible to decode not only errors but also (generalized) erasures. This new decoding algorithm allows us to decode more rank errors since the support is then partially known. In that case since the size of the balls depends directly on the dimension of the support, it leads to a dramatic increase of the size of the decodable balls. Semantically, what happens is that the signer can fix an erasure space, which relaxes the condition for finding a preimage. This approach works because in the particular case of our algorithm, it is possible to consider the erasure space at no cost in terms of error correction: to put it differently, the situation for LRPC is different from traditional Hamming metric codes for which "an error equals two erasures".
In practice it is possible to find parameters (not flat at all) for which it is possible to decode a random syndrome with the constraint that its support contains a fixed random subspace. Fixing part of the rank-support of the error, (the generalized erasure) allows us more rank-errors. For suitable parameters, the approach works then as follows: for a given random syndrome-space element s, one chooses a random subspace T of fixed dimension t (a generalized erasure of Definition 2), and the algorithm returns a small rank-weight word, whose rank-support E contains T , and whose syndrome is the given element s. Of course, there is no unicity of the error e since different choices of T lead to different errors e, which implies that the rank of the returned error is above the GVR bound: it is however only just above the GVR bound for the right choice of parameters.
LRPC decoding with errors and generalized erasures
Setting: Let an [n, k] LRPC code be defined by an (n − k) × n parity-check matrix H whose entries lie in a space F ⊂ GF (q m ) of small dimension d. Let t and r ′ be two parameters such that
Set r = t + r ′ . Given an element of the syndrome space s, we will be looking for a rank r vector e of GF (q m ) n with syndrome s. We first look for an acceptable subspace E of dimension r of GF (q m ) and then solve the linear system H.e t = s where e ∈ E n . To this end we choose a random subspace T of dimension t of GF (q m ) and impose the condition T ⊂ E.
The subspace T being fixed, we now describe the set of decodable elements of the syndrome space. We will then see how to decode them.
Definition 4. Let F 1 and F 2 be two fixed linearly independent elements of the space F . We shall say that an element s ∈ GF (q m ) n−k of the syndrome space is T -decodable if there exists a rank r subspace E of GF (q m ) satisfying the following conditions.
the coordinates of s all belong to the space F E and together with the elements of the space F T they generate the whole of F E .
Decoding algorithm. We now argue that if a syndrome s is T -decodable, we can effectively find e of rank r such that H.e t = s. We first determine the required support space E. Since the decoder knows the subspaces F and T , he has access to the product space F T . He can then construct the subspace S generated by F T and the coordinates of s. Condition (iii) of T -decodability ensures that the subspace S is equal to F E for some E, and since
condition (ii) implies that E is uniquely determined and that the decoder recovers E by computing the intersection of subspaces
It remains to justify that once the subspace E is found, we can always find e of support E such that H.e t = s. This will be the case if the mapping
can be shown to be surjective. Extend {F 1 , F 2 } to a basis {F 1 , · · · , F d } of F and let {E 1 , · · · , E r } be a basis of E. Notice that the system H.e t = s can be rewritten formally as a linear system in the small field GF (q) where the coordinates of e and the elements of H are written in the basis {E 1 , · · · , E r } and {F 1 , · · · , F d } respectively, and where the syndrome coordinates are written in the product basis
We therefore have a linear system with n.r unknowns and (n − k).rd equations over GF (q) that is defined by an (n.r) × (n − k)rd formal matrix H f (say) whose coordinates are functions only of H (see [14] for more details on how to obtain H f from H).
We now see that the matrix H can be easily chosen so that the matrix H f is of maximal rank n.r, which makes the mapping (1) surjective, for any subspace E of dimension d satisfying condition (i) of T -decodability.
Remarks:
1. For applications, we will consider only the case where nr = (n − k)rd, meaning that the mapping (1) is always one-to-one. 2. The system H.e t = s can be formally inverted and stored in a pre-processing phase, so that the decoding complexity is only that of multiplication by a square matrix of length nr, rather than a cubic inversion. 3. In principle, the decoder could derive the support E by computing
rather than simply E = F −1 1 S ∩ F −1 2 S, and the procedure would work in the same way in cases when (2) holds but not the simpler condition (ii). This potentially increases the set of decodable syndromes, but the gain is somewhat marginal and condition (ii) makes the forthcoming analysis simpler. For similar reasons, when conditions (i)-(iii) are not all satisfied, we do not attempt to decode even if there are cases when it stays feasable. Figure 1 summarizes the decoding algorithm. Note that the decoder can easily check conditions (i)-(iii), and that a decoding failure is declared when they are not satisfied.
Proportion of decodable syndromes for unique decoding of LRPC codes
Signature algorithms based on codes all inject the message space in some way into the syndrome space and then decode them to form a signature. We should therefore estimate the proportion of decodable syndromes. The classical decoding approach tells us to look for a preimage by H that sits on the Gilbert-Varshamov bound: for typical random codes, a preimage typically Input: T = T1, · · · , Tt a subspace of GF (q m ) of dimension t, H an (n−k)×n matrix with elements in a subspace F = F1, · · · , F d of dimension d, and s ∈ GF (q m ) n−k . Output: a vector e = (e1, . . . en) such that s = H.e t , with ei ∈ E, E a subspace of
Recovering the support E of the error Compute the support of the error E = F −1 1 S ∩ F −1 2 S, and compute a basis {E1, E2, · · · , Er} of E.
3.
Recovering the error vector e = (e1, . . . , en)
eij Ej, solve the system H.e t = s, where the equations H.e t and the syndrome coordinates si are written as elements of the product space P = E.F in the basis {F1E1, · · · , F1Er, · · · , F d E1, · · · , F d Er}.
The system has nr unknowns (the eij) in GF (q) and (n − k).rd equations from the syndrome. exists and is (almost) unique. Computing such a preimage is a challenge, however. In our case, we are looking for a preimage above the Gilbert-Varshamov bound, for which many preimages exist, but for a fixed (erasure) subspace T , decoding becomes unique again. In the following, we count the number of T -decodable syndromes and show that for some adequate parameter choices, their proportion can be made to be close to 1. It will be convenient to use the following notation.
Definition 5. For a subspace T of GF (q m ) of dimension t, denote by E(T ) the number of subspaces of dimension r = r ′ + t that contain T .
Proof. Consider the case where r = t + 1, we need to construct distinct subspaces of dimension t + 1 containing T . This can be done by adjoining an element of GF (q m ) modulo the subspace Furthermore, under the conditions r(2d − 1) ≤ m and
we also have the lower bound:
Note that condition (4) depends only on the subspace F and can be ensured quite easily when designing the matrix H. Random spaces F with random elements F 1 and F 2 will typically have this property. Condition (3) depends on the choice of the subspace T : as will be apparent from Lemma below, for a random subspace T condition (3) holds with probability very close to 1.
The complete proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix A.
Remarks:
1. It can be shown with a finer analysis that the term (1 − 1(q − 1)) 2 in the lower bound can be improved to a quantity close to 1 − 1(q − 1). 2. For large q, Theorem 1 shows that, for most choices of T , the density of T -decodable syndromes essentially equals
Remarkably, it is possible to choose sets of parameters (m, t, r, d), with (n − k) = d(r − t), such that the exponent in (5) equals zero, which gives a density very close to 1.
Example of parameters with density almost 1: For q = 2 8 , m = 18, n = 16, k = 8, t = 2, r ′ = 4, the algorithm decodes up to r = t + r ′ = 6 for a fixed random partial support T of dimension 2. The GVR bound for a random [16, 8] code with m = 18 is 5, the Singleton bound is 8, we see that the decoding radius 6 is therefore just above the GVR bound at 5 and smaller than the Singleton bound at 8. Moreover one can notice that if parameters (m, t, r, d) satisfy the two equations (r − t)(m − r) + (n − k)(rd − m) = 0 and (n − k) = d(r − t) (the case for which the density is almost 1), then for any integer α greater than 1, the parameter set (αm, αt, αr, d) satisfies the same equations, and hence for a given d one obtains an infinite family of parameters with density almost 1.
Decoding in practice. In practice it easy enough to find sets of parameters for which the density of decodable syndromes is very close to 1, i.e. such that (r−t)(m−r)+(n−k)(rd−m) = 0.
4 RankSign + , a signature scheme for rank metric based on augmented LRPC codes
We saw in the previous section how to construct a matrix H of an LRPC code, with a unique support decoding, which opens the way for a signature algorithm. In practice the best decoding results are obtained for d = 2: the natural strategy is to define for the public key a matrix H ′ = AHP , where A is a random (n − k) × (n − k) invertible matrix in the extension field and P is an invertible n×n matrix in the small field. However, it is easily possible for a cryptanalyst to recover the words of small weight d = 2 in H ′ and it is therefore necessary to hide the matrix H in another way. In what follows we present a simple type of masking: RankSign + which consists in adding a few random columns to H, other more complex types of masking are also possible: RankSign × (RankSign-multiply) and RankSign +× , which are presented in Appendix D.
Suppose one has a fixed support T of dimension t. We consider the public matrix H ′ = A(R|H)P with R a random (n − k) × t ′ matrix in GF (q m ). We will typically take t ′ = t but one could envisage other values of t ′ . We denote by augmented LRPC codes such codes with parity-check matrices H ′ = A(R|H)P .
Starting from a partial support T that has been randomly chosen and is then fixed, the signature consists in decoding not a random s but the syndrome s ′ = s − R.(e 1 , · · · , e t ) t for e i random independent elements of T .
The overall rank of the solution vector e is still r = t+r ′ . the masking gives us that the minimum rank-weight of the code generated by the rows of H ′ is t + d rather than purely d: therefore recovering the hidden structure involves finding relatively large minimum weight vectors in a code. In practice we consider d = 2 and H is a n/2 × n matrix with all coordinates in a space F of dimension 2. Moreover for {F 1 , F 2 } a basis of F , we choose the matrix H such that when H is written in the basis {F 1 , F 2 }, one obtains a n × n invertible matrix (of maximal rank) over GF (q). It can be done easily. Figure 2 describes the scheme, where || denotes concatenation. The cost of the decoding algorithm is quadratic because of preprocessing of H −1 f , hence the major cost comes from the linear algebra over the large field GF (q m ).
Signature complexity: (n − k) × (n + t) operations in GF (q m ). Verification complexity: (n − k) × (n + t) operations in GF (q m ).
The length l of the seed can be taken as 80 Log 2 (q) for instance.
5 Security analysis of the scheme
Security of augmented LRPC codes
In the previous section we defined augmented-LRPC with dual matrix H ′ = A(R|H)P , we now formulate the problem Ind-LRPC codes (Ind-LRPC) on the security of these codes:
Problem [Ind-LRPC] The augmented LRPC codes are indistinguishable from random codes
We know make the following assumption on the problem that we discuss in the following:
Assumption: the Ind-LRPC problem is difficult Discussion on the assumption: The family of augmented LRPC codes is not of course a family of random codes, but they are weakly structured codes: the main point being that they have a parity-check matrix one part of which consists only in low rank coordinates the other part consisting in random entries. The attacker never has direct access to the LRPC matrix H, which is hidden by the augmented part.
The minimum weight of augmented LRPC codes is smaller than the GVR bound, hence natural attacks consist in trying to use their special structure to attack them. There exist general attacks for recovering the minimum weight of a code (see Section 2.3) but these attacks have a fast increasing complexity especially when the size of the base field GF (q) increases. We first list obvious classical attack for recovering the structure of the augmented-LRPC codes and then describe specific attacks.
• Previously known structural attacks for rank codes The main structural attack for the rank metric is the Overbeck attack on the GPT cryptosystem, the attack consists in considering concatenated public matrices G q , G q 2 , ..., G q n−k−1 , in that case the particular structure of Gabidulin codes enables one to find a concatenated matrix with a rank default; this is due to the particular structure of the Gabidulin codes and the fact that for Gabidulin codes G q i is very close to G q i+1 . In the case of LRPC codes, since the rows are taken randomly in a small space, this attack makes no sense, and cannot be generalized.
• Dual attack: attack on the dual matrix H ′ : another approach consists in finding directly words of small weight induced by the structure of the code, from which one can hope to recover the global structure. For augmented LRPC codes, the rank of the minimum weight words is d + t: d for LRPC and t for the masking. This attack becomes very hard when t increases, even for low t. For instance for t = 2 and d = 2 it gives a minimum weight of 4, which for most parameters n and k is already out of reach of the best known attacks on the rank syndrome decoding (see Section 2).
• Attack on the isometry matrix P: Remember that for rank metric codes, the isometry matrix is not a permutation matrix but an invertible matrix on the base field GF (q). The attacker can then try to guess the action of P on H, since d is usually small negating this action may permit to attack directly a code of rank d. Since d is small it is enough to guess the resulting action of P on n − k + 3 columns by considering only the action of P coming from the first t columns of the matrix R -the only columns which may increase the rank-, it means guessing (n − k + 3) × t elements of GF (q) (since coordinates of P are in GF (q), hence a complexity of q (n−k+3)t . In general this attack is not efficient, as soon as q is not small (for instance q = 256).
• Attack on recovering the support An attacker may also try to recover directly an element of the support, for instance in the case of d = 2, for F the error support generate by {F 1 , F 2 }, up to a constant, one can rewrite F as generated by 1 and F 2 .F −1 1 . Then the attacker can try to guess the particular element F 2 .F −1 1 , recover F and solve a linear system in the coordinates of the elements of H. The complexity of this attack is hence q m .(nd) 3 , in the most favourable case when d = 2, this attack is exponential and becomes infeasible for q not too small.
• Differential support attack
It is also possible to search for attack directly based on the specific structure of the augmented LRPCcodes. The general idea of the differential support attack is to consider the vector space V on the base field GF (q) generated by the elements of a row of the augmented matrix H ′ and to find a couple (x, x ′ ) of elements of V such that x ′ x ∈ F the support of the LRPC code. The complexity of the attack is at least q (n−k)(d−1)+t , the detail of the attack can be found in Appendix B. In practice this exponential attack is often the best attack to recover the structure of the code and distinguish the augmented LRPC code from a random code.
Conclusion on the hardness of the Ind-LRPC problem
We saw that there were many way to attack the Ind-LRPC problem, in particular because of the rich structure of rank metric, meanwhile the previous analysis of general known attacks shows that these attacks are all exponential with a strong dependency on the size of q. Moreover we also considered very specific attack (like the differential support attack) related to the particular structure of the augmented LRPC codes which uses deeply the structure of the code. This analysis seems to show that the Ind-LRPC problem is indeed difficult, with all known attacks being exponential. In practice it is easy to find parameters which resist to all these attacks.
Information leakage
We considered in previous attacks the case where no additional information was known besides the public parameters. Often the most efficient attacks on signatures is to recover the hidden structure of the public key by using information leaking from real signatures. This for instance is what happened in the case of NTRUSign: the secret key is not directly attacked, but the information leaked from real signatures enables one to recover successfully the hidden structure. We show in the following that with our masking scheme no such phenomenon can occur, since we prove that, if an attacker can break the signature scheme for public augmented matrices with the help of information leaking from a number of (approximately) q real signatures, then he can also break the scheme just as efficiently *without* any authentic signatures. Theorem 2 below states the unleakibility of signatures. It essentially states that valid signatures leak no information on the secret key. More precisely, under the random oracle model, there exists a polynomial time algorithm that takes as input the public matrix H ′ and, produces couples (m, σ), where m is a message and σ a valid signature for m when one's only access to the hashing oracle is through the simulator, and this with the same probability distribution as those output by the authentic signature algorithm. Therefore whatever forgery can be achieved from the knowledge of H ′ and a list of valid signed messages, can be simulated and reproduced with the public matrix H ′ as only input. Theorem 2. : For any algorithm A that leads to a forged signature using N ≤ q/2 authentic signatures, there is an algorithm A ′ with the same complexity that leads to a forgery using only the public key as input and without any authentic signatures.
Proof. see Appendix B
⊓ ⊔
Unforgeability
There are two different ways to obtain a forgery, the first approach consists in trying to obtain a direct forgery by searching for a low weight words corresponding to the hashed syndrome value. From the assumption that the augmented LRPC codes are indistinguishable from random codes, the complexity of such a problem as explained in section 2.3 is difficult and best known attack are exponential. It is also possible to attack directly the structure of the augmented LRPC code, but we described in the previous section possible attacks using this particular strucure and explained how it was difficult even with a special focus on the particular structure of augmented-lRPC codes. At last it is also possible to use extra-information like known signature to try to attack the structure of the code, but we prove in Theorem 2 that it was possible to choose parameters with a small probability of leaking in 1/q, for instance with large q. If such an attack using information leaking would exist, then it could be done directly on the public key without additional information. Overall since all known attacks on our scheme (direct forgery and Ind-LRPC) have all exponential complexities it is possible to obtain parameters for the scheme.
Practical security and parameters
In the following we give in Table 1 some examples of parameters. The parameters are adjusted to resist all previously known attacks. The security reduction holds for up to q/2 signatures, hence if one considers q = 2 40 it means we are protected against leakage for up to 2 40 obtained authentic signatures. such an amount of signatures is very difficult to obtain in real life, moreover if one multiplies by the amount of time necessary to obtain a signature (about 2 30 for q = 2 40 ) we clearly see that obtaining such a number of authentic signatures is out of reach, and it justifies our security reduction.
We also give parameters for q lower than 2 40 : in that case the reduction is weaker in the sense that it does not exclude a leaking attack for sufficiently many signatures. However, such a leaking attack seems difficult to obtain anyway, and these parameters can be seen as challenges for our system.
In the table the considered codes are [n + t, k + t] codes which give a signature of rank r. The dual code H ′ is a [n + t, n − k] code which contains words of rank d + t. In the table 'LP' stands for the logarithmic complexity of the algebraic Levy-Perret attack, for instance in the case n = 16, one gets a [18, 8] code in which one searches for words of rank 4, it gives 270 quadratic equations for 126 unknowns, with a theoretical complexity of 2 120 from [5] (remember that for a random quadratic system over GF (2) with n unknowns and 2n equations the complexity is roughly 2 n operations inthe base field GF (2). The complexity of a direct attack for searching low weight words of weight d + t with combinatorial attacks (see section 2.3) is given in 'Dual'. At last 'DS' stands for the differential support attack of section 5.1 and 'DA' stands for the direct attack on the signature in which one searches directly for a forgery for a word of weight r in a [n + t, k + t] code. In the table the number of augmented columns is usually t except for the last example for which one adds 2 columns rather than t = 5.
The analysis of the securiyt complexities shows that the best attack (in bold in the table) depends on the given parameters: when q is large the algebraic attacks are better since they do not really depends on q, when d increases the decoding algorithm is less efficient and then one get closer from the Singleton bound and direct forgery for the signature becomes easier. For other parameters, usually the specific structural attack differential support attack DS is better.
n n-k m q d t r' r GVR Singleton pk(bits) sign(bits) LP Dual DS DA 16 Implementation: We implemented our scheme in a non optimized way, the results we obtained showed that for small q the scheme was very fast, when q increases, one has to consider the cost of multiplication in GF (q), however for q = 2 8 or q = 2 16 some optimized implementation may reduce this cost.
Conclusion
In this paper we introduced a new approach to devising signatures with coding theory and in particular in the rank metric, by proposing to decode both erasures and errors rather than simply errors. This approach enables one to return a small weight word beyond the Gilbert-Varshamov bound rather than below. We proposed a new efficient algorithm for decoding LRPC codes which makes this approach a realizable. We then proposed a signature scheme based on this algorithm and the full decoding of a random syndrome beyond the Gilbert-Varshamov bound. We also showed that it was possible to protect our system against leakage from authentic signatures. Overall we propose different types of parameters, some of which are rather small. The parameters we propose compares very well to other existing signature schemes on coding theory as the CFS scheme for instance. 
A Proof of Theorem 1
In this section we give a complete proof of Theorem 1 To prove this theorem we will rely on the following lemma:
Lemma ??. Let A be a fixed subspace of F m q of dimension α and let T be a subspace of dimension t (with possibly t = 0) such that dim AT = αt. Let B be a subspace generated by T together with β random independent uniform vectors, with β satisfying α(t + β) ≤ m. Then
Proof. Suppose first that B = B ′ + b where b is a uniformly chosen random element of F m q and where B ′ ⊃ T is a fixed space such that dim AB ′ = α(t + β − 1). Let A P be a projective version of A, meaning that for every a = 0 in A, we have exactly one element of the set
We have dim AB < α(t + β − 1) + α if and only if the subspace bA has a non-zero intersection with AB ′ , and also if and only if the set bA P has a non-zero intersection with AB ′ . Now,
since for any fixed a = 0, we have that ab is uniformly distributed in F m q , and since the number of elements in bA P equals (|A| − 1)/(q − 1).
Now write
We have that the probability
that AB is not full-rank is not more than
so that (8) gives:
We now give the proof of the theorem:
Proof of Theorem 1. To obtain a T -decodable syndrome, we must choose n − k elements in a space F E for a given space E that contains T . There are E(T ) ways of choosing E, and for any given E there are at most q dim F dim E = q dr ways of choosing a syndrome coordinate in F E . This gives the upper bound on T (t, r, d, m).
We proceed to prove the lower bound. First consider that Lemma ?? proves that, when we randomly and uniformly choose a subspace E that contains T , then with probability at least 1 − 1/(q − 1), we have:
by property (4). This last fact implies, that (11) gives us simultaneously that:
In other words, both conditions (i) and (ii) of T -decodability are satisfied. We have therefore proved that the proportion of subspaces E containing T that satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) is at least (1 − 1/(q − 1)). Now let E be a fixed subspace satisfying conditions (i) and (ii). Among all (n − k)-tuples of elements of F E , the proportion of those (n − k)-tuples that together with F T generate the whole of F E is at least
We have therefore just proved that given a subspace E satisfying conditions (i) and (ii), there are at least (1 − 1/q)(q rd ) n−k (n − k)-tuples of F E n−k satisfying condition (iii).
To conclude, notice that since a T -decodable syndrome entirely determines the associated subspace E, the set of T -decodable syndromes can be partitioned into sets of (n − k)-tuples of F E n−k satisfying condition (iii) for all E satisfying conditions (i) and (ii). The two lower bounds on the number of such E and the number of T -decodable syndromes inside a given F E n−k give the global lower bound of the Theorem. ⊓ ⊔
B Differential support attack
In this appendix we detail the differential support attack which deeply uses the structure of the augmented LRPC codes. The LRPC code H, used to build the signature, is hidden by some matrix S,P and R. As well as any trapdoor cryptosystems, we can imagine a specific way to extract the code H from the public key H ′ = S.(R|H).P . In this situation, H is defined by d matrix H 1 . . . H d of size (n − k) × n in GF (q) such that Σ d l=1 H l .F l = H. In this section, we will provide a specificity of H ′ which leads to an exponential extractor of a representation of the code H permiting to decode and forge a signature. We give the complexity of this extractor and use it as an upper bound for the best attack in this cryptosystem. To start with, notice that the code H has severals representations. Indeed, it is constructed using H 1 . . . H d and F 1 . . . F d . Here we want to choose a cannonical representation to simplify the demonstration. For that purpose, we search the matrix n × n P ′ instead of P in GF (q) such that H ′ = S(R|Id.F 1 . . . Id.F d ).P ′ with Id the identity matrix. We can find such a matrix because the parameters are choosen such as d(n − k) = n and the matrix H l have rank (n − k), with 1 ≤ l ≤ d. We can also choose, without loss of generality, an homogeneous form for F 1 , . . . , F d where F 1 = 1. This can be deduced by interverting the matrix S and S. 1 F 1 . In the following we search to extract a code H of the form (Id|Id.F 2 | . . . |Id.F d ).
In this paragraph we describe the vector space in GF (q) generated by the element in a line of H ′ . We set (S i,j ) 1≤i,j≤n−k for the coefficients of S and (R i,j ) (1≤i≤n−k)(1≤j≤t) for the coefficients of R. The coefficient (i, j) of the matrix S.(R|H) can be express by :
Each element of the row i of the matrix S.(R|H) belongs to the GF (q)-vector space V i =< S i,1 F 1 , . . . , S i,n−k F 1 , . . . , S i,n−k F d , R 1 , . . . , R t > with R 1 , . . . , R t some coefficients depending on S and R. Eventually, the multiplication by the matrix P on the right does not change that each element of the i-th row of H ′ belongs to the vector space V i . It is a priori difficult to retreive an element F l , 1 < l ≤ d, from one of the V i . On the other hand, we can verify that an element α is a F l by computing V i ∩ V i .α −1 . If α is one of the F l , the intersection will be < S i,1 , . . . , S i,n > for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n − k. Then we can retreive < F 1 , . . . , F d > with the intersection ∪ n−k p=1 V i . 1 S i,p . As far as d is not a large number, it is not difficult to extract the whole structure from that. A simple way to find a F l is to test any possibilities in GF (q m ) with the intersection described before. We will see next a more efficient method which uses the repetition of the element F l , 1 < l ≤ d, in the rows of the LRPC code H. The research of one of the (F l ) 1<l≤d is based on the research of an element x of one of the V i such that x = Σ n−k j=1 λ j S i,j .F l , with λ j in GF (q) and l = 1. We know that there exists another element x ′ = Σ n−k j=1 λ j S i,j .F 1 in V i . Hence, there exists a combination in the vector space V i . 1
x equal to 1 F l . This corresponds to a combination of elements in the row i of H. 1 x which would be equal to 1 F l . If we find a combination c ∈ GF (q) n+t such that H. 1
x .c T = (v 1 , . . . , v n−k ) T and v i = 1 F l for a particular i, then we have that v i = 1 F l for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n − k. Indeed the different V i are built in a same way from H ′ and if a combination c gives L i c T = Σ n−k j=1 λ j S i,j with L i the row i of H ′ then we have by construction L p c T = Σ n−k j=1 λ j S p,j with the same λ j . Finally, to retreive this combination c, we can search c such that (L 1 . 1
x 2 )c T = 0 where x 1 is picked as random in V 1 and x 2 is generated with the same algorithm that x 1 but using V 2 . We obtain a complexity based on the probability to find a useful element x at random : q (n−k)(d−1)+t . This point of view permits to show that even a specific attack on the hidden code H which uses all its particularities will not succeed with well choosen parameters since the complexity emains exponential. The invertible matrix P in GF (q) seems to sufficiently mix the vector space V i to make difficult the fact to recover a vector x which could permit to extract the structure of H.
C Proof of Theorem 2
Recall that a signature of a message M is a pair (x ′ , y ′ ) where y ′ is a hashed value of the message M and y ′ = H ′ x ′T and rank(x ′ ) = r. If A is an algorithm that leads to a forgery with the use of N authentic signatures, then the algorithm A ′ consists of a simulated version of A where authentic signatures (x ′ , y ′ ) are replaced by couples (x ′′ , y ′′ ) where x ′′ is randomly and uniformly chosen among vectors of rank-weight e, and y ′′ = H ′ x ′′T is claimed to be the hashed value of the message M output by a random oracle. In the random oracle model, the algorithm A ′ must behave exactly as algorithm A and give the same output whenever (x ′′ , y ′′ ) is statistically indistinguishable from (x ′ , y ′ ).
We now compare the statistics of (x ′ , y ′ ) and (x ′′ , y ′′ ). We have H ′ = A(R|H)P and since the transformation:
is one-to-one, comparing the statistics of (x ′ , y ′ ) and (x ′′ , y ′′ ) amounts to comparing the distributions of (x a , y a ) (authentic) and (x s , y s ) (simulated).
Now (x a , y a ) is obtained in the following way: the signer chooses a subspace T of F q m together with a random vector τ ∈ T t of rank t and is given a vector u which is uniformly distributed in the syndrome space F n−k q m and is equal to A −1 h(M ) − Rτ T . Precisely, the signer chooses a random vector τ of rank t, and sets T to be the subspace generated by its coordinates. The signer then proceeds to try to decode u, meaning it looks for a subspace E of F q m that contains T and such that all coordinates of u fall into F E , where F is the space generated by the elements of the LRPC matrix H. He succeeds exactly when the syndrome vector u is T -decodable in the sense of Definition 4: when this doesn't occur, the decoder aborts.
When the syndrome u is T -decodable, the decoder proceeds to solve the equation
and then sets x a = (τ, x H ) to create the couple (x a , y a = (R|H)(x a ) T ) in (13) . Recall from Remark 1 in Section 3.2 that the matrix H has been chosen so that equation (15) (equivalently equation (1)) always has a unique solution for every T -decodable u.
We may therefore speak about T -decodable couples (x H , u), where u uniquely determines x H and x H uniquely determines u. Now, to re-cap, the authentic signer starts with uniformely random u, and whenever u turns out to be non T -decodable, then we declare a decoding failure and start the whole process again generating another τ , another random space T and another u by another call to the random oracle h (meaning a counter appended to the message M is incremented before applying the random hash again). This keeps happening until we hit a T -decodable u. We see therefore that when it does hit a T -decodable u, the couple (x H , u)
is uniformly distributed among all T -decodable couples.
We now turn to the action of the simulator: what the simulator does is he tries to generate a uniform T -decodable couple (x H , u) through x H rather than through u like the signer.
Specifically, the simulator starts with a random subspace E of F q m of dimension r and an x ′′ with coordinates independently and uniformly drawn from E. Since the transformation (14) x ′′ → x s = P x ′′ is rank-preserving, the simulator is implicitely creating a uniform vector x s of E n . Write x s = (τ, x H ).
With overwhelming probability (at least 1 − 1/q r−t ), the vector τ ∈ E t is of maximum rankweight t, since its coordinates are independently and uniformly chosen in E. The vector τ generates the required random space T . Let u = Hx T H : note that by construction, all its coordinates must be in F E . Consider the conditions (i),(ii),(iii) of Definition 4 for u to be T -decodable.
Remember that the first two conditions (i) and (ii) are properties only of the subspace E. When they are not satisfied, no choice of x H can yield a T -decodable couple (x H , u). When conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied we have that, since the mapping (15) x H → u is invertible, the vector u is a uniform random vector in F E n−k . Since n − k + dim F T = dim F E , the probability that condition (iii) is not satisfied is governed by the probability than a random vector falls into a given subspace of F E of co-dimension 1 and is of the order of 1/q: it is also at most 1/(q −1) according to computation (12) . We also see that the number of x H that satisfies condition (iii) is independent of the space E and is always the same for all E that satisfy conditions (i) and (ii). This last fact implies that when -A random uniform subspace E is chosen among all possible subspaces E of dimension r, -a random x H is chosen in E n , then either (x H , u) is not T -decodable, or (x H , u) is T -decodable and is uniformly distributed among all T -decodable couples.
The simulator has no oracle to tell him when he has produced a non T -decodable couple, he can only hope this doesn't occur. As long as he produces T -decodable couples (x H , u), then they are distributed (uniformly) exactly as those that are produced by the authentic signer and are undistinguishable from them. If we call π the probability that he produces a non-decodable u, then he can reasonably expect to produce a list of approximately N = 1/π signatures (x ′′ , y ′′ ) that are undistiguishable from genuine signatures in the random oracle model.
Consider now the probability π that the simulator produces a non-decodable u. It is at most the sum of the probabilities that E does not satisfy (i) and (ii) and the probability ≤ 1/(q − 1) that (iii) is not satisfied. The probability that E does not satisfy (i) and (ii) is at most the probability that the product space (F −1 1 F +F −1 2 )E does not have maximal dimension (2d−1)r, as argued in the proof of Theorem 1, and is at most 1/(q−1). We obtain therefore π ≤ 1/(q−1)+1/(q−1) = 2/(q − 1) ≈ 2/q which concludes the proof.
D Other types of masking
Besides the augmented LRPC simple masking of Section 4, it is also possible to consider other types of masking, even if in that case there is no formal reduction, these masking have independent interest.
